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9eXeCUtive sUMMAry
In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted that the 
greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration—with millions 
of	people	displaced	by	shoreline	erosion,	coastal	flooding	and	agricultural	disrup-
tion.	Since	then	various	analysts	have	tried	to	put	numbers	on	future	flows	of	climate	
migrants (sometimes called “climate refugees”)—the most widely repeated prediction 
being 200 million by 2050. 
But	repetition	does	not	make	the	figure	any	more	accurate.	While	the	scientific	
argument	for	climate	change	is	increasingly	confident,	the	consequences	of	climate	
change for human population distribution are unclear and unpredictable. With so 
many other social, economic and environmental factors at work establishing a linear, 
causative relationship between anthropogenic climate change and migration has, to 
date,	been	difficult.	
This may change in future. The available science, summarized in the latest 
assessment report of the IPCC, translates into a simple fact; on current predictions 
the “carrying capacity” of large parts of the world will be compromised by climate 
change. 
The meteorological impact of climate change can be divided into two distinct driv-
ers of migration; climate processes such as sea-level rise, salinization of agricultural 
land,	desertification	and	growing	water	scarcity,	and	climate events	such	as	flooding,	
storms	and	glacial	lake	outburst	floods.	But	non-climate	drivers,	such	as	government	
policy, population growth and community-level resilience to natural disaster, are also 
important. All contribute to the degree of vulnerability people experience. 
The problem is one of time (the speed of change) and scale (the number of people 
it will affect). But the simplistic image of a coastal farmer being forced to pack up 
and move to a rich country is not typical. On the contrary, as is already the case with 
political refugees, it is likely that the burden of providing for climate migrants will be 
borne by the poorest countries—those least responsible for emissions of greenhouse 
gases. 
Temporary migration as an adaptive response to climate stress is already apparent in 
many areas. But the picture is nuanced; the ability to migrate is a function of mobility 
and	resources	(both	financial	and	social).	In	other	words,	the	people	most	vulnerable	
to climate change are not necessarily the ones most likely to migrate.
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Predicting	future	flows	of	climate	migrants	is	complex;	stymied	by	a	lack	of	baseline	
data, distorted by population growth and reliant on the evolution of climate change as 
well as the quantity of future emissions. Nonetheless this paper sets out three broad 
scenarios, based on differing emissions forecasts, for what we might expect. These 
range from the best case scenario where serious emissions reduction takes place and 
a “Marshall Plan” for adaptation is put in place, to the “business as usual” scenario 
where the large-scale migration foreseen by the most gloomy analysis comes true, 
or is exceeded. 
Forced migration hinders development in at least four ways; by increasing pressure 
on urban infrastructure and services, by undermining economic growth, by increasing 
the	risk	of	conflict	and	by	leading	to	worse	health,	educational	and	social	indicators	
among migrants themselves. 
However, there has been a collective, and rather successful, attempt to ignore the 
scale of the problem. Forced climate migrants fall through the cracks of international 
refugee and immigration policy—and there is considerable resistance to the idea of 
expanding	the	definition	of	political	refugees	to	incorporate	climate	“refugees”.	Mean-
while, large-scale migration is not taken into account in national adaptation strategies 
which tend to see migration as a “failure of adaptation”. So far there is no “home” for 
climate	migrants	in	the	international	community,	both	literally	and	figuratively.		
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1. introDUCtion
A growing crisis 
As early as 1990 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) noted 
that the greatest single impact of climate change might be on human migration—with 
millions	of	people	displaced	by	shoreline	erosion,	coastal	flooding	and	agricultural	
disruption. Since then, successive reports have argued that environmental degradation, 
and in particular climate change, is poised to become a major driver of population 
displacement—a crisis in the making.
In the mid-1990s, it was widely reported that up to 25 million people had been 
forced from their homes and off their land by a range of serious environmental pres-
sures including pollution, land degradation, droughts and natural disasters. At the time 
it was declared that these “environmental refugees”, as they were called (see Box 1), 
exceeded all documented refugees from war and political persecution put together.4 
The 2001 World Disasters Report of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
repeated the estimate of 25 million current “environmental refugees”. And in October 
2005 the UN University’s Institute for Environment and Human Security warned that 
the international community should prepare for 50 million environmental refugees 
by 2010.5 
A few analysts, of whom Norman Myers of Oxford University is perhaps the best 
known, have tried to estimate the numbers of people who will be forced to move over 
the long term as a direct result of climate change. “When global warming takes hold” 
Professor Myers argues, “there could be as many as 200 million people overtaken by 
disruptions of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, by droughts of unprece-
dented	severity	and	duration,	and	by	sea-level	rise	and	coastal	flooding”.6 
200 million climate migrants by 2050?
Professor Myers’ estimate of 200 million climate migrants by 2050 has become the 
accepted	figure—cited	in	respected	publications	from	the	IPCC	to	the	Stern	Review	
on the Economics of Climate Change.7 
This	 is	 a	 daunting	figure;	 representing	 a	 ten-fold	 increase	 over	 today’s	 entire	
documented refugee and internally displaced populations.8 To put the number in 
perspective it would mean that by 2050 one in every 45 people in the world will have 
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been displaced by climate change. It would also exceed the current global migrant 
population. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) about 
192 million people, or  per cent of the world’s population, now live outside their 
place of birth.9 
But this prediction is still very tentative. Professor Myers himself admits that his 
estimate, although calculated from the best available data, required some “heroic 
extrapolations”.10 Not that any criticism is implied; the simple fact is that nobody 
really knows with any certainty what climate change will mean for human popula-
tion distribution. Current estimates range between 25 million and 1 billion people 
by 2050.11 
A complex, unpredictable relationship
The	scientific	basis	for	climate	change	is	increasingly	well	established.	An	enor-
mous amount of time and energy have gone into determining the meteorological 
impacts of climate change in terms of raised sea levels, altered precipitation patterns 
and	more	frequent	and	fierce	storms.	Much	less	time,	energy	and	resources,	however,	
have been spent on empirical analysis of the impacts of climate change on human 
populations. 
Partly, this is because the relationship is so unpredictable: the science of climate 
change is complex enough – let alone its impact on societies of differing resources and 
varied capacity to adapt to external shocks. Partly, it is because individual migrants’ 
decisions to leave their homes vary so widely: deciding causality between economic 
“pull”	and	environmental	“push”	is	often	highly	subjective.	And	finally,	disaggregating	
the role of climate change from other environmental, economic and social factors 
requires an ambitious analytical step into the dark. 
For example, Hurricane Katrina, which lashed the Gulf Coast of the United States 
in August 2005 and temporarily displaced over a million people,12 is often presented 
(quite rightly) as a preview of the kind of more intense and frequent extreme weather 
events we can expect from climate change. But the hurricane was more than just a 
meteorological event: the damage it caused was a product of poor disaster planning, 
consistent underinvestment in the city’s protective levees as well the systematic 
destruction of the wetlands in the Mississippi delta that might have lessened the force 
of	the	storm.	Labelling	it	a	“climate	change	event”	over-simplifies	both	its	causes	
and its effects. 
Nevertheless, estimates of future numbers of climate change migrants are repeated 
almost	glibly,	either	for	shock	value	or	for	want	of	a	better	figure.1 This paper sets out 
1
to challenge the predictions: by trying to pick apart the terminology, the time frame 
and the degree of uncertainty implicit in them. 
Section 2 looks at the ways that climate change might lead to increased migration. 
Section  then analyses some predictions for numbers of future climate migrants, 
examines some of the uncertainties with these predictions and lays out three different 
tentative scenarios on future numbers of migrants. Which (if any) of these comes to 
pass depends on future population growth, distribution and resilience to environmental 
pressures as well as the ability of the international community to curb greenhouse 
gas emissions and help the poorest countries adapt to the impacts of climate change. 
Section 4 assesses the development implications of forced migration within coun-
tries and across borders. Finally, Section 5 investigates a variety of international and 
domestic policy responses to the prospect of large-scale population movements caused 
by climate change. 
Box 1
Refugee oR migRant?
Labels are important. One immediately contentious issue is whether people 
displaced	by	climate	change	should	be	defined	as	“climate refugees” or as 
“climate migrants”.	This	is	not	just	semantics—which	definition	becomes	
generally accepted will have very real implications for the obligations of the 
international community under international law.  
Campaigners have long used the phrase “environmental refugee” or 
“climate refugee” to convey added urgency to the issue. They argue that, 
in the most literal sense of the words, such people need to “seek refuge” 
from the impacts of climate change. Any other terminology, they maintain, 
would downplay the seriousness of these people’s situation. Moreover, the 
word “refugee” resonates with the general public who can sympathize with 
the implied sense of duress. It also carries fewer negative connotations than 
“migrant” which tends to imply a voluntary move towards a more attractive 
lifestyle. 
However,	the	use	of	the	word	“refugee”	to	describe	those	fleeing	from	
environmental pressures is not strictly accurate under international law. The 
United Nations’ 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of 
refugees	are	clear	that	the	term	should	be	restricted	to	those	fleeing	persecu-
tion: “a refugee is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being per-
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secuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, 
and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country”.14
There are other problems with using the term “refugee”. Strictly speaking, 
categorization as a refugee is reliant on crossing an internationally recognized 
border: someone displaced within their own country is an “internally displaced 
person” (IDP). Given that the majority of people displaced by climate change 
will	likely	stay	within	their	own	borders,	restricting	the	definition	to	those	
who cross international borders may seriously understate the extent of the 
problem. Second, the concept of a “refugee” tends to imply a right of return 
once	the	persecution	that	triggered	the	original	flight	has	ceased.	This	is,	of	
course, impossible in the case of sea level rise and so again the term distorts 
the nature of the problem. Third, there is the concern that expanding the def-
inition of a refugee from political persecution to encompass environmental 
stressors would dilute the available international mechanisms and goodwill 
to cater for existing refugees.
The	question	of	definition	makes	for	a	hotly	contested	debate	amongst	
international human rights lawyers.15 However, in practice there is consider-
able resistance among the international community to any expansion of the 
definition	of	a	“refugee”.	Developed	countries	fear	that	accepting	the	term	
refugee would compel them to offer the same protections as political refu-
gees; a precedent that no country has yet been willing to set.16 Meanwhile, 
the international institutions currently charged with providing for refugees, 
principally	the	office	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees	
(UNHCR), are already overstretched and are unable to cope with their cur-
rent “stock” of refugees.17 The UNHCR itself is taking on an expanded role 
in the provision of care to IDPs and so is resistant to any further expansion 
of its mandate.18,19 
If the term “climate refugee” is problematic it is still used, in part, for 
lack of a good alternative. “Climate evacuee” implies temporary movement 
within national borders (as was the case with Hurricane Katrina). “Climate 
migrant” implies the “pull” of the destination more than the “push” of the 
source country and carries negative connotations which reduce the implied 
responsibility of the international community for their welfare. 
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But	for	lack	of	an	adequate	definition	under	international	law	such	migrants	
are almost invisible in the international system: no institution is responsible 
for collecting data on their numbers, let alone providing them with basic 
services. Unable to prove political persecution in their country of origin they 
fall through the cracks in asylum law. 
How then should we categorize these people? The International Organiza-
tion	for	Migration	(IOM)	proposes	the	following	definition,	“Environmental	
migrants are persons or groups of persons, who, for compelling reasons of 
sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their 
lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or chose 
to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their 
country or abroad”.20 
This study mostly uses the term “forced climate migrant” in the know-
ledge that it is not a universally accepted term but in the hope that it conveys 
a reasonably accurate impression of the increasing phenomenon of non-     
voluntary population displacement likely as the impacts of climate change 
grow and accumulate. 
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2. CLiMAte ChAnGe AnD forCeD MiGrAtion
Not such a wonderful world
Put simply, climate change will cause population movements by making certain 
parts of the world much less viable places to live; by causing food and water supplies 
to	become	more	unreliable	and	increasing	the	frequency	and	severity	of	floods	and	
storms. Recent reports from the IPCC and elsewhere set out the parameters for what 
we can expect: 
By 2099 the world is expected to be on average between 1.8ºC and 4ºC hotter 
than it is now.21 Large areas are expected to become drier—the proportion of land 
in constant drought expected to increase from 2 per cent to 10 per cent by 2050.22 
Meanwhile, the proportion of land suffering extreme drought is predicted to increase 
from 1 per cent at present to 0 per cent by the end of the 21st century.2 Rainfall 
patterns will change as the hydrological cycle becomes more intense. In some places 
this means that rain will be more likely to fall in deluges (washing away top-soil and 
causing	flooding).	
Changed rainfall patterns and a more intense hydrological cycle mean that 
extreme weather events	such	as	droughts,	storms	and	floods	are	expected	to	become	
increasingly frequent and severe.24 For example, it is estimated that the South Asian 
monsoon will become stronger with up to 20 per cent more rain falling on eastern 
India and Bangladesh by 2050.25 Conversely, less rain is expected at low to mid-lati-
tudes; by 2050 sub-Saharan Africa is predicted to have up to 10 per cent less annual 
rainfall in its interior.26 
Less rain would have particularly serious impacts for sub-Saharan African agri-
culture which is largely rain-fed: the 2007 IPCC report of the Second Working Group 
estimates that yields from rain-fed agriculture could fall by up to 50 per cent by 2020.27 
“Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries and 
regions is projected to be severely compromised by climate variability and change” 
the report notes.28
According to the same report crop yields in central and south Asia could fall by 
0 per cent by the middle of the 21st century.29 Some fish stocks will migrate towards 
the poles and colder waters and may deplete as surface water run-off and higher sea 
temperatures lead to more frequent hazardous algal blooms and coral bleaching.0 
Compounding this, climate change is predicted to worsen a variety of health problems 
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leading to more widespread malnutrition and diarrhoeal diseases, and altered distribu-
tion of some vectors of disease transmission such as the malarial mosquito.1
Meanwhile, melting glaciers will	 increase	 the	 risk	of	flooding	during	 the	wet	
season and reduce dry-season water supplies to one-sixth of the world’s population, 
predominantly in the Indian sub-continent, parts of China and the Andes.2 Melting 
glaciers will increase the risk of glacial lake outburst floods particularly in moun-
tainous countries like Nepal, Peru and Bhutan.
Global average sea level, after accounting for coastal land uplift and subsidence, is 
projected to rise between 8 cm and 1 cm by 200, between 17 cm and 29 cm by 2050, 
and between 5 cm and 82 cm by 2100 (depending on the model and scenario used). 
Large delta systems are at particular risk of flooding.4 The area of coastal wetlands 
is projected to decrease as a result of sea level rise. For a high emissions scenario and 
high climate sensitivity wetland loss could be as high as 25 per cent  and 42 per cent 
of the world’s existing coastal wetlands by the 2050s and 2100s respectively.5
According to Nicholls and Lowe (2004), using a mid-range climate sensitivity 
projection, the number of people flooded per year is expected to increase by between 
10 and 25 million per year by the 2050s and between 40 and 140 million per year by 
2100s, depending on the future emissions scenario.6 
The avalanche of statistics above translates into a simple fact—that on 
current trends the “carrying capacity” of large parts of the world, i.e. the 
ability of different ecosystems to provide food, water and shelter for human 
populations, will be compromised by climate change. 
Climate processes and climate events
Robert McLeman of the University of Ottawa, unpacks the drivers of forced migra-
tion into two distinct groups.7 First, there are the climate drivers. These themselves 
are of two types – climate processes and climate events. Climate processes are slow-
onset	changes	such	as	sea-level	rise,	salinization	of	agricultural	land,	desertification,	
growing water scarcity and food insecurity. Sea level rise patently makes certain coastal 
areas and small island states uninhabitable. Cumulatively they erode livelihoods and 
change the incentives to “stick it out” in a particular location. Some women in the 
Sahel, for example, already have to walk up to 25 kilometres a day to fetch water. If 
their journey gets longer they will simply have to move permanently.8 
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On a national level sea level rise could have serious implications for food security 
and economic growth. This is a particular concern in countries that have a large part 
of their industrial capacity under the “one metre” zone. Bangladesh’s Gangetic plain 
and the Nile Delta in Egypt, which are breadbaskets for both countries, are two such 
examples. Egypt’s Nile Delta is one of the most densely populated areas of the world 
and is extremely vulnerable to sea level rise. A rise of just 1 metre would displace at 
least	6	million	people	and	flood	4,500	km2 of farmland.9 
Climate events, on the other hand, are sudden and dramatic hazards such as mon-
soon	floods,	 glacial	 lake	 outburst	floods,	 storms,	 hurricanes	 and	 typhoons.	These	
force people off their land much more quickly and dramatically. Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita, for example, which lashed the Gulf Coast of the United States in August 
and September 2005 left an estimated 2 million people homeless.40 The 2000 World 
Disasters Report estimated that 256 million people were affected by disasters (both 
weather-related and geo-physical) in the year 2000, up from an average of 211 mil-
lion per year during the 1990s – an increase the Red Cross attributes to increased 
“hydro-meteorological” events.41
 
Non-climate drivers 
Equally important though are the non-climate drivers. It is clear that many natural 
disasters are, at least in part, “man-made”. A natural hazard (such as an approaching 
storm) only becomes a “natural disaster” if a community is particularly vulnerable to 
its impacts. A tropical typhoon, for example, becomes a disaster if there is no early-
warning system, the houses are poorly built and people are unaware of what to do in 
the event of a storm. A community’s vulnerability, then, is a function of its exposure 
to climatic conditions (such as a coastal location) and the community’s adaptive 
capacity (the capacity of a particular community to weather the worst of the storm 
and recover after it). 
Different regions, countries and communities have very different adaptive capaci-
ties: pastoralist groups in the Sahel, for example, are socially, culturally and technic-
ally equipped to deal with a different range of natural hazards than, say, mountain 
dwellers in the Himalayas.42 National and individual wealth is one clear determinant 
of vulnerability – enabling better disaster risk reduction, disaster education and 
speedier responses. In the decade from 1994 to 200 natural disasters in countries of 
high human development killed an average of 44 people per event, while disasters in 
countries of low human development killed an average of 00 people each.4
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On a national scale, Bangladesh has very different adaptive capacities and 
disaster resilience to the United States. In April 1991 Tropical Cyclone Gorky hit the 
Chittagong district of south-eastern Bangladesh. Winds of up to 260 kilometres per 
hour and a six-metre high storm surge battered much of the country killing at least 
138,000 people and leaving as many as 10 million people homeless.44 The following 
year in August 1992, a stronger	storm,	the	category	five	Hurricane	Andrew,	hit	Florida	
and Louisiana with winds of 280 kilometres per hour and a 5.2-metre storm surge. 
But, while it left US$ 4 billion in damages in its wake, it caused only 65 deaths.45  
Climate change will challenge the adaptive capacities of many different communi-
ties, and overwhelm some, by interacting with and exacerbating existing problems of 
food security, water scarcity and the scant protection afforded by marginal lands. At 
some point that land becomes no longer capable of sustaining livelihoods and people 
will be forced to migrate to areas that present better opportunities. The “tipping 
points” will vary from place to place and from individual to individual. Natural 
disasters might displace large numbers of people for relatively short periods of time, 
but the slow-onset drivers are likely to displace permanently many more people in 
a less-headline grabbing way. 
Population, poverty, and governance are key variables
Migration, even forced migration, is not usually just a product of an environmental 
“push” from a climate process like sea level rise. Except in cases of climate events, 
where	people	flee	for	their	lives,	it	does	require	some	kind	of	“pull”:	be	it	environmental,	
social or economic. There has to be the hope of a better life elsewhere, however much 
of a gamble it might be. Past environmental migratory movements, such as in the US 
Dust Bowl years in the 190s (see Box ), suggest that being able to migrate away 
from severe climatic conditions, in this case prolonged drought, requires would-be 
migrants	to	have	some	“social	and	financial	capital”	such	as	existing	support	networks	
in the destination area and the funds to be able to move. 46 
It also should be mentioned, and this is absent from much of the campaigning 
literature, that climate change will make some places better able to sustain larger 
populations.	This	is	particularly	reflected	in	predictions	for	less-severe	total	tempera-
ture rises, i.e. 2 to ºC over the 21st century rather than rise of 4 to 5 degrees or more. 
This is for three main reasons. First, higher temperatures will likely extend growing 
seasons and reduce frost risk in mid to high-latitude areas such as Europe, Australia 
and New Zealand and make new crops viable (already vineyards are spreading north in 
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Britain).47 Second, the “fertilization effect” of more CO2 in the atmosphere is predicted 
to increase crop yields and the density of vegetation in some areas.48 And third, altered 
rainfall patterns mean that rain might increase in areas previously suffering water stress. 
A 2005 study, for example, predicts that a warmer north Atlantic and hotter Sahara 
will trigger more rain for the Sahel.49 It is not inconceivable then that there might be 
migration in order to take advantage of the effects of climate change. 
In other words, climate change might provide both “push” and “pull” for some 
population displacement. This is not to downplay the seriousness of climate change: 
above 4 or 5ºC the predicted impacts of climate change become almost universally 
negative.50 But it is to make that point that the role of climate change in population 
displacement is not a linear relationship of cause and effect, of environmental “push” 
and economic “pull”.  
Non-climatic drivers remain a key variable. It is, after all, population growth, in-
come distribution and government policy that push people to live on marginal lands 
in	the	first	place.	In	other	words	a	community’s	vulnerability	to	climate	change	is	
not a constant – it can be increased or decreased for reasons that have nothing to do 
with greenhouse gas emissions.51 In this sense it is the non-climatic drivers (that put 
vulnerable people in marginal situations) that can be as important a determinant of 
the problem as the strength of the “climate signal” itself.  
As Steve Lonergan of the University of Victoria, Canada, noted in 1998, “there 
is too often an uncritical acceptance of a direct causal link between environmental 
degradation and population displacement. Implicit in these writings is the belief that 
environmental degradation—as a possible cause of population displacement—can 
be separated from other social, economic or political causes. It must be recognized 
that the degradation of the environment is socially and spatially constructed; only 
through a structural understanding of the environment in the broader political and 
cultural context of a region or country can one begin to understand the “role” it plays 
as a factor in population movement”.52
Intuitively we can see how climate change might play a role in future movements 
of	people.	But	putting	empirically	sound	figures	on	the	extent	of	the	problem	is	com-
plex. And it is hard to persuade decision makers to take the issue seriously without 
being	able	to	wave	concrete	figures	in	front	of	them.	This	is	the	subject	of	the	next	
section. 
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3. PreDiCtions 
“Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.”
Niels Bohr, Danish physicist (1885-1962)
Climate migration is not new
Archaeological evidence suggests that human settlement patterns have responded 
repeatedly to changes in the climate.5,54 There is evidence that the emergence of the 
first	large,	urban	societies	was	driven	by	a	combination	of	climatic	and	environmental	
desiccation. The complex societies of Egypt and Mesopotamia, for example, emerged 
as people migrated away from desiccating rangelands and into riverine areas. The 
resulting need to organize densely packed populations in order to manage scarce re-
sources	in	restricted	areas	has	been	identified	as	one	of	the	main	driving	forces	behind	
the	development	of	the	first	civilizations.55 
Much later, during the 4th century CE, growing aridity and frigid temperatures from 
a prolonged cold snap caused the Hun and German hordes to surge across the Volga 
and Rhine into milder Gaul and eventually led to the sack of Rome by the Visigoths. 
Likewise, the 8th century Muslim expansion into the Mediterranean and southern 
Europe was, to some extent, driven by drought in the Middle East.56 
 
Existing patterns of climate migration
Migration is (and always has been) an important mechanism to deal with climate 
stress. Pastoralist societies have of course habitually migrated, with their animals, from 
water source to grazing lands in response to drought as well as part of their normal 
mode of life. But it is becoming apparent that migration as a response to environmental 
change is not limited to nomadic societies.
In western Sudan, for example, studies have shown that one adaptive response 
to	drought	is	to	send	an	older	male	family	member	to	Khartoum	to	try	and	find	paid	
labour to tide the family over until after the drought.57 Temporary migration in times 
of climate stress can help top-up a family’s income (through remittances from paid 
work elsewhere) and reduce the draw on local resources (fewer mouths to feed).
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When climate stresses coincide with economic or social stresses, the potential for 
forced	migration	from	rural	areas	increases	significantly.	But	the	picture	is	nuanced.	In	
West Africa, the distance that people migrate is a function of their family’s resources; 
in	really	bad	drought	years	they	can	not	afford	to	travel	far	and	instead	try	to	find	paid	
work in local cities (see Box 2). Known locally as “eating the dry season” it occurs 
today in many parts of drought-stricken West Africa.
Box 2
“eating the dRy season” – tempoRaRy laBouR migRation in West afRica
In the West African Sahel recent studies have cast light on the use of tem-
porary migration as an adaptive mechanism to climate change. The region has 
suffered a prolonged drought for much of the past three decades and one way 
that households have adapted is by sending their young men and women in 
search of wage labour after each harvest.58 But how far they travel depends, 
in part, on the success of the harvest. 
A	good	harvest	might	give	the	family	sufficient	resources	to	send	a	member	
to Europe in search of work. While the potential rewards in terms of remit-
tances are high, it is a highly speculative gamble – in addition to dangerous 
journey, the rewards are uncertain. In addition the chances are the migrant 
will not be back in time for the next year’s planting. 
But in a drought year, when harvests are poor, the young men and women 
tend to stay much closer to home, instead travelling to nearby cities for paid 
work so as to reduce the drain on the household’s food reserves and top-up 
household income. In such years the risk of losing the “migration gamble” 
is simply too great.59 
The	ability	to	migrate	is,	by	definition,	a	function	of	mobility.	In	the	1930s	Dustbowl	
Years in the US, migrants from the Great Plains tended to be tenant farmers without 
strong	ancestral	or	financial	ties	to	the	land	(see	Box	3).60 The decision to migrate is 
normally taken at a household level (unless the state is clearing an area) – and relies 
on	individual	calculations	of	social	and	financial	capital.	Migration	is	typically	not	the	
first	adaptive	response	households	take	when	confronted	by	climate	stress;	rather	it	
resorted	to	when	other	means	of	adaptation	(such	as	selling	livestock)	are	insufficient	
to meet their immediate needs and often when their communities or governments have 
proven incapable of giving assistance.
2
Migration, especially when it is a response to slower-acting climate processes 
(rather than a sudden climatic event like a hurricane), typically requires access to 
money, family networks and contacts in the destination country. Even in the most 
extreme, unanticipated natural disasters – migrants, if they have any choice, tend to 
travel along pre-existing paths – to places where they have family, support networks, 
historical	ties	and	so	on.	Most	people	displaced	by	environmental	causes	will	find	new	
homes within the boundaries of their own countries. Evacuees from Hurricanes Rita 
and Katrina, for example, did not stream across the border to Mexico but typically 
found temporary refugee with family members elsewhere in the country.61 
Box 3
the dust BoWl yeaRs
During the 190s, multiple years of below-average rainfall and above-
average temperatures in the Great Plains of the United States coincided with 
a nation wide economic slump (the Great Depression) and resulted in the 
widespread failure of small farms, particularly those on marginal lands. It is 
believed that up to 00,000 “Okies” left the region during the “Dust Bowl” 
decade– many of them migrating to California.62 
Migrants to California from the Great Plains mostly consisted of intact 
nuclear families of above-average education, from a range of occupational 
backgrounds, and who had extended family support waiting for them in   
California. They also tended to be tenant farmers without the same ancestral 
investment in their land as the landowners who were more likely to stay 
behind.6
The clichéd image of a coastal farmer getting inundated by rising sea levels and 
being forced to pack up and move to a rich country is simply not born out by ex-
perience. The 2004 Asian Tsunami, for example, killed more than 200,000 people 
and displaced twice as many. But those people were largely not displaced to OECD 
countries. Instead the burden of displacement (and of providing for evacuees) is 
overwhelmingly born by the local region. 
Those	who	cannot,	or	choose	not	to,	find	new	homes	within	their	own	country	tend	
to seek refuge in places where they have existing cultural or ethnic ties. So Bangla-
deshis might seek refuge in India or Pakistan, Indonesians from Sumatra would look 
to Malaysia and so on.64 Likewise, inter-continental migration is most likely to follow 
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pre-existing paths and old colonial relationships. So the United Kingdom might be an 
obvious destination for Pakistanis and West Indians, France for would-be migrants 
from Francophone West Africa and Australia and New Zealand for some groups in 
the	South	Pacific.	
In short, people have had to move for environmental reasons for thousands of years. 
But recent examples provide useful, albeit sobering, analogues for the likely impact 
of	future	climate	change.	The	1998	monsoon	floods	in	Bangladesh	brought	some	of	
the	worst	flooding	in	living	memory,	inundating	two-thirds	of	the	country	for	two	
months, devastating its infrastructure and agricultural base and leading to fears about 
the country’s long-term future in a world of higher ocean levels and more intense 
cyclones.65	The	floods	left	an	estimated	21	million	people	homeless.66 Meanwhile the 
Yangtze	floods	of	the	same	year	temporarily	displaced	an	estimated	14	million	people	
and triggered the largest ever peace-time deployment of the People’s Liberation Army 
to provide humanitarian aid and rebuild critical infrastructure.67 However, it is one 
thing	to	reflect	on	past	and	present	climate-triggered	population	movements	and	quite	
another	to	predict	accurate	figures	for	future	population	displacement.	
The problem of prediction 
Although meteorological science and climate modelling techniques have progressed 
dramatically over the past decade, we still cannot accurately predict the impact of 
climate change on our weather systems. Amongst much else there is uncertainty 
about the way rainfall patterns will change and continuing debate on whether global 
warming	will	lead	to	more	frequent	and	fierce	hurricanes.68 
So	far,	and	quite	understandably,	the	focus	of	the	scientific	community	has	been	
on establishing the biophysical extent and nature of anthropogenic climate change. 
Less time and energy have gone into predicting the impact of future climate change 
on human societies in any more than the most general terms. The complex interactions 
between different meteorological and social factors make cause and effect models 
tricky	and	often	inappropriate.	Consequently,	the	figures	that	analysts	have	produced	
to date are little more than well-educated guesswork. Developing more solid predic-
tions will require a lot of hard number-crunching that is only really starting now.69
These predictions are complicated by three factors: 
• First, forced climate migration will take place against a background of 
unprecedented changes in the number and distribution of the world’s population. 
The global population is currently growing at a rate of 1.1 per cent and is 
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predicted to reach 9.075 billion by 2050 (from its 2005 level of 6.54 billion). 
Meanwhile, there is an accelerating move to urban areas. Already 49 per cent of 
the world’s population live in cities, and the growth rate of the urban population 
is nearly double (2%) that of total population growth.70 
 These trends are especially pronounced in low and middle-income countries. 
Between 2005 and 2010 Burundi, for example, is expected to have a 
population growth rate of .7 per cent and an urban growth rate of 6.8 per 
cent.71 Meanwhile, the Sahelian region of northern Nigeria, perhaps the area 
of the country most susceptible to climate change, is already characterized 
by high population growth (about .1%) and rapid urbanization (about 7%).72 
Clearly it would be absurd to attribute the entire urban drift to climate change, 
but disaggregating what role climate change might play in added rural-urban 
migration is speculative.
•	 Second,	we	have	no	real	base-line	figure	for	current	migratory	movements.	Nor	
is there much capacity in developing countries or the international community 
to gather this sort of data, particularly for internal migration. What limited 
capacity exists is focused on tracking cross-border migration. Given that a 
majority of forced climate migrants will stay within their own borders (see 
page 22) the machinery to collect data on these movements simply does not 
yet exist. Recent initiatives such as the EACH-FOR project of the European 
Commission are only now beginning to try to address this statistical gap (see 
Box 5).
• Third, what happens in the second half of the 21st century depends to a great 
extent on what we do today. Until 2050 the degree of inertia in the climate 
system means that climate change over the next 50 years is largely pre-
determined.7 However, the extent and nature of climate change after then is 
reliant on current emissions. Consequently, many analysts think that it is highly 
speculative to try to push predictions past 2050.74
The climate canaries
Nonetheless, there has been a somewhat breathless competition in the world’s 
media	to	find	the	first	conclusive	“victims”	of	climate	change	–	who,	like	a	miner’s	
canary, will mark the beginning of a period of irreversible climate impacts. Four cases 
have been quite extensively highlighted in the past few years: the Cartaret islands 
in Papua New Guinea, the residents of Lateu village in Vanuatu, the relocation of 
Shishmaref village on Sarichef island in Alaska, and the submergence of Lohachara 
island in India’s Hooghly river. 
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In	2005	it	was	officially	decided	to	evacuate	the	1,000	residents	of	the	Carteret	
Islands, a group of small and low-lying coral atolls administered by Papua New 
Guinea. Storm-related erosion and salt water intrusion had rendered the population 
almost entirely dependent on outside aid. Ten families at a time are now being moved 
to the larger island of Bougainville, 100 kilometres away.75 
A second group of about a hundred residents of Lateu, on the island of Tegua on 
Vanuatu, were relocated farther inland, again following storm-damage, erosion and 
salt damage to their original village. In both cases, the declaration of their status as 
“the	first	climate	change	refugees”	was	timed	to	coincide	with	the	United	Nations	
Climate Convention meeting in November 2005.76 
Shishmaref village lies on Sarichef island just north of the Bering strait. A combi-
nation of melting permafrost and sea-shore erosion at a rate of up to . metres a year 
have forced the inhabitants to relocate their village several kilometres to the south.77 
It is thought that climate change has directly exacerbated the sea-erosion by thinning 
the sea ice which used to reduce the force of local tides and erosive currents. 
In	December	2006	there	were	widespread	reports	of	the	first	submergence	of	an	
inhabited island due to climate change. Researchers reported that Lohachara island 
in	the	Hooghly	river	delta,	once	home	to	10,000	people,	and	which	had	first	started	
flooding	20	years	ago,	had	finally	been	entirely	submerged.	One	of	a	number	of	van-
ishing islands in the delta, the loss of the islands and other coastal land in the delta 
has left thousands of people homeless. 78 
 
However,	in	the	interests	of	balance,	it	is	worth	noting	that	there	is	little	scientific	
consensus	that	these	four	cases	are	definitively	the	result	of	anthropogenic	climate	
change. Fred Terry, director of the UNDP’s programme in Bougainville argues that in 
the	case	of	the	Carteret	Islands	dynamite	fishing	has	destroyed	the	natural	protection	
offered by the reef, whilst natural subsidence and tectonic movement might also explain 
the islands’ inundation. In fact plans to evacuate the residents have been discussed 
since the early 1980s, but were interrupted by the war on the neighbouring Papua 
New Guinean island of Bougainville.79 Likewise, Lohachara island, a sandbar in the 
Hooghly delta (and so inherently unstable), was eroded by river currents, weakened 
by mangrove destruction, and submerged by tectonic titling and local subsidence.80 
So far the publicized examples of forced migration caused by anthropogenic 
climate change are more anecdotal than empirical, affecting a few hundred or thou-
sand people at a time. The urge to grab the headlines has tended to obscure the fact 
that	we	know	that	climate	variation	has	influenced	human	population	distribution	for	
thousands of years. But while the evidence for a distinctively anthropogenic “climate 
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change signal” in forced migration so far is circumstantial, it is mounting. And with 
all available scenarios predicting accelerating climate change impacting growing 
populations and more people living on marginal land, forced climate migration is 
certain to increase. The important questions are; by how much? and with what im-
plications for development? 
The good, the bad, and the (very) ugly: Climate migrant scenarios
The impact of climate change as a driver of future forced migration depends on 
several factors: 
• the quantity of future greenhouse gas emissions;
• the rate of future population growth and distribution;
• the meteorological evolution of climate change; 
• the effectiveness of local and national adaptation strategies.
The IPCC has devised a series of scenarios, called the Emission Scenarios of 
the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (or SRES for short), which set out 
a range of different future emissions scenarios varied according to demographic, 
technological and economic developments. There are six basic “storylines”; each 
of which aggregates different rates of population and economic growth as well as 
the future “energy mix”. For reference, these storylines are described in Annex 1. 
They range from the most-greenhouse gas intensive (A1F1 – where energy is mostly 
derived from fossil fuels and economic growth is rapid) to the less-intensive B1 sto-
ryline (where the world economy moves towards less-resource intensity and cleaner 
technology). All the scenarios assume no additional climate change initiatives such 
as the emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Three of the SRES scenarios are 
used here as starting points to imagine three highly speculative scenarios for future 
climate-induced migration.81 
The good
The	first	(B1)	is	the	best	case	scenario.	Its	impact	is	relatively	low	but	so	also	is	its	
likelihood. The B1 storyline describes a world whose population peaks mid-century 
around 9 billion and declines thereafter towards 7 billion. There is a rapid change in 
economic structures towards a service and information economy with a reduction in 
material	intensity	and	the	introduction	of	clean	and	resource	efficient	technologies.	
“The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustain-
ability, including improved equity, but without additional climate initiatives”.82
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In addition (and this is where this scenario diverges from the B1 storyline) we can 
imagine that a serious post 2012 regime is put in place by the international community 
to reduce carbon emissions. The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
join as full members and work to cut their own emissions. Atmospheric concentra-
tions of CO2 stabilize around 600 ppm by end of century leading to temperature rise 
over the century of around 1.8 degrees and sea level rise of from 18 to 8 cm.8 In 
addition a “Marshall plan” for adaptation helps countries deal with the worst impacts 
of climate change. 
Nonetheless, according to the Stern report, such a temperature rise would still lead 
to a 20 to 0 per cent decrease in water availability in some vulnerable regions such 
as Southern Africa and the Mediterranean countries. It would also result in declining 
crop yields in tropical regions. In Africa crop yields could be cut by between 5 to 
10 per cent.84 Meanwhile up to 10 million more people would be affected by coastal 
flooding	each	year.85 
In	this	case	the	headline	figure	for	climate	migration	(the	200	million	“climate	
refugees” by 2050) might, in hindsight, seem like an exaggeration. Instead we could 
expect increased migration of between 5 and 10 per cent along existing routes (see 
page 21). There would be increased rural to urban migration but it would prove largely 
manageable, if not indistinguishable, within existing patterns of migration.
The bad
Our second scenario uses the “A1B” storyline as its starting point. A1B envisages a 
world of very rapid economic growth, with a global population that peaks mid-century 
and	declines	thereafter,	as	well	as	the	swift	up-take	of	new	and	more	efficient	technolo-
gies. The scenario predicts economic convergence among regions, increased social and 
cultural interactions and a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita 
income. In this scenario the world’s energy is sourced from a balance between fossil 
intensive and non-fossil energy sources.86 We can imagine that international efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions are delayed, patchy and not particularly effective. 
Some effort and funds are invested into adaptation, but not enough. 
The estimate for temperature rise over the 21st century for the A1B storyline is 
2.4ºC (with a likely range from 1.7ºC to 4.4ºC). Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
by the end of the century are 850 ppm (three times pre-industrial levels).87 With higher 
temperatures the practical implications of climate change are much greater. Under 
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this scenario sea level rise would be between 21 cm and 48 cm and precipitation in 
sub-tropical areas would fall by up to 20 per cent.88 According to the Stern report, 
a ºC temperature rise would mean 1 to 4 billion people would suffer water short-
ages and between 150 to 550 additional million people would be at risk of hunger. 
Conversely	other	areas	would	gain	unwelcome	water	with	coastal	flooding	affecting	
between 11 and 170 million additional people each year.89 Marginal lands would 
become increasingly uninhabitable, with dramatic increases in internal rural to ur-
ban migration and also emigration to richer countries, particularly of young, skilled 
people. Meanwhile, millions of people would be temporarily displaced by individual 
extreme weather events. 
The ugly
The third scenario uses the A1F1 storyline as its starting point. A1F1 is similar 
to A1B in that it forecasts rapid economic growth and a global population that peaks 
mid-century and falls thereafter. However, unlike A1B, energy in the A1F1 world 
continues to be overwhelmingly sourced from fossil-fuel supplies – and is a “busi-
ness as usual scenario” without any Kyoto emission reductions or serious attempts at 
adaptation.90 On this trend, atmospheric concentration of CO2 by 2099 will be 1,550 
ppm:	five	times	pre-industrial	levels	and	four	times	current	levels.	
Such CO2 levels would result in a temperature rise over the century of 4.0ºC (with 
a likely range from 2.4ºC to 6.4ºC) and sea level rise from 29 cm to 59 cm.91 Accord-
ing to the Stern report a temperature rise of 4.0ºC would result in a 0 to 50 per cent 
decrease in water availability in Southern Africa and Mediterranean. Agricultural 
yields would decline by 15 to 5 per cent in Africa and entire regions, such as parts 
of Australia, would fall out of production.92 With high climate sensitivity, the number 
of	people	flooded	per	year	could	be	as	many	as	160	million	by	the	2050s	and	420	
million by the 2100s.9 
Under this scenario, predictions of 200 million people displaced by climate change 
might easily be exceeded. Large areas of southern China, South Asia, and the Sahe-
lian region of sub-Saharan Africa could become uninhabitable on a permanent basis. 
Climate forced migration would be unmistakeable with tens of millions of people at 
a	time	displaced	by	extreme	weather	events,	such	as	floods,	storms	and	glacial	lake	
outburst	floods,	and	many	millions	more	displaced	by	climate	processes	like	deserti-
fication,	salinization	of	agricultural	land	and	sea	level	rise.
0
The above scenarios all assume a roughly linear evolution of climate change. 
But the picture would change again in the case of abrupt climate change such as the 
collapse of the Gulf Stream or melting of the Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets. The 
IPCC estimates that the elimination of the Greenland ice sheet would lead to a con-
tribution to a sea level rise of about 7 m.94 The Stern report estimated that the melting 
or collapse of the ice sheets would raise sea levels and eventually threaten 4 million 
km² of land which is currently home to 5 per cent (around 10 million people) of the 
world’s population.95 
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4. DeveLoPMent iMPLiCAtions
 
There is irony in the fact that it is the developing countries—the least responsible 
for emissions of greenhouse gases—will be the most affected by climate change. If the 
situation with refugees from war and political persecution is any indication they will 
also bear the greatest burden of providing for forced climate migrants. For example, 
in	2000,	the	20	countries	with	the	highest	ratios	of	official	refugees	had	an	annual	
per-capita income of just US$ 850.96
 
Assessing regional vulnerabilities 
Numerically and geographically, South and East Asia are particularly vulnerable 
to large-scale forced migration. This is because sea level rise will have a dispropor-
tionate effect on their large populations living in low-lying areas. Six of Asia’s ten 
mega-cities are located on the coast (Jakarta, Shanghai, Tokyo, Manila, Bangkok and 
Mumbai).97 China, meanwhile, has 41 per cent of its population, 60 per cent of its 
wealth and 70 per cent of its megacities in coastal areas.98 
Millions more are vulnerable in Africa, particularly around the Nile Delta and 
along the west coast of Africa. Changed patterns of rainfall would have particularly 
serious impacts for food security in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the latest IPCC 
report reduced rainfall could lower crop yields by as much as 20 per cent by 2020, 
leading to increased malnutrition.99 
Small island states around the world are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise 
because in many cases (the Bahamas, Kiribati, the Maldives and the Marshall Islands) 
much of their land is less than three or four metres above present sea level.100 One 
1999	analysis	estimated	that,	by	2080,	flood	risk	for	people	living	in	small	 island	
states will be 200 times greater than if there had been no global warming.101 Other 
island states tend to have high levels of development and high density population 
around their coasts. Half the population of the Caribbean, for example, lives within 
1.5 km of the shoreline.102 
Forced migration and development
Over the short term, climate change forced migration will make the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) harder to achieve.10 Over the long term, large-scale 
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climate change migration could roll back much of the progress that has been made so 
far. Particularly threatened is the uninterrupted provision of the education and health 
services that underlie goals 2 (universal primary education) and goals 4 and 5 (reducing 
child and maternal mortality and combating HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases).  
Forced migration hinders development in at least four ways; by increasing pressure 
on urban infrastructure and services, undermining economic growth, increasing the 
risk	of	conflict	and	leading	to	worse	health,	educational	and	social	indicators	among	
migrants themselves. 
What impact climate change migration ultimately has on development depends, 
of course, on which of the above storylines (page 26) plays out: it is clear that 200 
million people displaced by climate change would be much more detrimental to 
development than 10 million. There is also a large difference in development out-
comes between those displaced by long-term climate processes (sea level rise) and 
short-term	climate	events	(storms).	Aggregated	figures	for	forced	climate	migration	
mask this distinction. 
4.1 The urban flood
Increasing food and water scarcity due to climate change in rural areas will 
accelerate the dramatic rural-urban drift in the developing world. Urban areas offer 
access to the cash economy (rather than subsistence farming) and can make it easier 
to provide services. However, rapid and unplanned urbanization has serious implica-
tions for urban welfare and urban service provision. 
Already, one-third of the world’s urban population, about 1 billion people, live 
in slums: in poor quality housing with limited clean water, sanitation and education 
services.104 By 200 it is estimated that this number will rise to 1.7 billion people.105 
High population densities and high contact rates help to spread disease, while health 
and education services are often inadequate. In India, for example, unplanned urban-
ization has been associated with the spread of dengue fever.106 
4.2 Hollowed economies
Mass migration disrupts production systems and undermines domestic markets. In 
addition, the loss of “human capital” in the form of the labour force and investment 
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in education undermines economic growth. This can establish a self-reinforcing of 
limited economic opportunity that contributes to future migration. 
The “brain drain” effect from developing countries is already a serious problem. 
One	of	the	legacies	of	the	1930s	Dust	Bowl	case	was	that	those	who	fled	the	drought	
were young, skilled families with some money and strong social networks – the very 
kind of people that are essential components of successful communities. “The places 
they left behind”, says Ottawa University’s Robert McLeman, “became increasingly 
polarized	between	affluent	property	owners	and	an	impoverished	underclass,	a	down-
ward spiral from which some communities never recovered. Future climate-migration 
holds a similar potential to have negative long-term consequences for socio-economic 
stability in affected areas”.107 Climate change could accelerate the brain drain as it 
is	typically	those	with	larger	reserves	of	financial	and	social	capital	who	are	able	to	
move away.  
4.3 Political instability and ethnic conflict 
Large-scale population displacement will redraw the ethnic map of many countries, 
bringing previously separate groups into close proximity with each other and in com-
petition for the same resources. In the context of poor governance, poverty and easy 
access to small arms these situations can easily turn violent. In Nigeria, ,500 square 
kilometres (1,50 square miles) of land are turning into desert every year, making 
desertification	the	country’s	leading	problem.	As	the	desert	advances,	farmers	and	
herdsmen are forced to move, either squeezing into the shrinking area of habitable or 
forced into the already overcrowded cities.108 There is also a fairly widely-held belief 
that the current crisis in Darfur has its origins in the extended drought that brought 
pastoralists into competition with farmers.109
Large population movements are already recognized by the UN Security Council 
as constituting a potential threat to international peace and security, particularly if 
there are existing ethnic and social tensions.110 According to John Ashton, the UK’s 
climate change envoy, “Massive migrations, particularly in the arid or semi-arid areas 
in which more than a third of the world’s people live, will turn fragile states into failed 
states and increase the pressure on regional neighbours – a dynamic that is already 
apparent in Africa”.111
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4.4 Health impacts and welfare of forced migrants 
Population displacement undermines the provision of medical care and vaccin-
ation programmes; making infectious diseases harder to deal with and more deadly. 
It is well documented that refugee populations suffer worse health outcomes than 
settled	populations.	Forced	migrants,	especially	forced	to	flee	quickly	from	climate	
events,	are	also	at	greater	risk	of	sexual	exploitation,	human	trafficking	and	sexual	
and gender-based violence.112 
Forced migration in response to climate stresses can also spread epidemic disease. 
Visceral leishmaniasis (VL) is one example. VL is a widespread parasitic disease with 
a global incidence of 500,000 new human cases each year. In northeastern Brazil, 
periodic epidemic waves of VL have been associated with migrations to urban areas 
after long periods of drought.11
Box 4
climate change migRation: a gendeR peRspective114
Far from being gender-neutral, climate change, and the use of migration 
as	a	coping	mechanism,	will	have	specific	gendered	impacts,	given	that	there	
is a “strong relationship between poverty and vulnerability to environmental 
change, and the stark fact that women, as a group, are poorer and less power-
ful than men”.115
For example, when rural families attempt to address environmental stress 
by having a member of their family migrate to the city to earn an income and 
thus shift direct reliance on climate-dependent natural resources, the effect 
on women and gender dynamics is complex. On the one hand, women left 
behind by male migrants may experience more autonomy and have greater 
decision-making power because they become de facto household heads after 
their husbands migrate.116 Male outmigration can also enhance the economic 
situation of the household left behind through remittances,117 which have 
grown	dramatically	in	recent	years	and	exceed	official	development	aid	in	
some developing countries.118 
On the other hand, however, male outmigration can exacerbate the poverty 
of rural women. As Sylvia Chant explains, “the fragile resource base of some 
de facto female-headed units may be compounded by low reserves of labour 
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or the inability to mobilize labour on account of social taboos regarding 
women’s access to machinery and participation in certain agricultural tasks.”119 
Furthermore, Chant notes, for example in both Bangladesh and Pakistan, that 
even with male outmigration, “women may not be able to take major decisions 
over household production or livelihoods in the home village itself without 
first	obtaining	permission	from	their	absent	partners	or	his	natal	kin.”120
In Africa, many men are migrant workers (or work seekers) in their own 
or other countries but faced with natural disasters and a diminishing resource 
base, women may seek to migrate as well, usually to urban centres.121 While 
lone women migrants will face similar challenges to their male counterparts 
in	finding	employment,	affordable	housing,	and	accessing	social	services,	
they	may	have	a	more	difficult	time	due	to	gender-based	discrimination.122 
This is evident in the case of women from the village of Kallayaran in Peru, 
where, as unskilled peasant labour, they have limited opportunities to work 
in	the	formal	sectors	of	urban	centres,	and	primarily	find	work	in	low-paid	
domestic services.12 
While	it	is	difficult	to	make	predictions	about	how	communities	will	adapt	
to climate change, the nature of migration as a result, and repercussions for 
gender dynamics and women’s lives, it is essential nonetheless to recognize 
that	 climate	 change	will	 have	 gender	 specific	 impacts,	 and,	 critically,	 to	
mainstream a gender perspective into climate change discussions. 
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5. PoLiCy resPonses
Heads in the sand
Despite the serious development implications of large-scale forced climate migra-
tion international capacity and interest in dealing with it is limited.124 Bold speeches and 
elaborate commitments to the pursuit of noble goals like refugee rights, environmental 
protection and sustainable development typically fall prey to narrow geopolitical 
interests when the time for action comes. The result is that forced climate migrants 
fall through the cracks of international refugee and immigration policy. There is no 
“home”	for	forced	climate	migrants,	either	literally	or	figuratively.		
Instead, there is a collective, and rather successful, attempt to ignore the scale of 
the problem. Until now the international community has largely focused on mitigating 
climate change by setting emissions targets for OECD countries and agonising about 
how to bring it new members to a post-Kyoto 2012 framework. More recently, greater 
attention has been paid to helping countries adapt to the impacts of climate change. 
But this approach to adaptation is fundamentally based on the idea of adapting “in 
situ”. Migration is seen as a failure of adaptation.  
Potential progress can be divided into three, quite distinct, areas. I say “potential” 
here as there has not been real progress on any front – yet. First is the legal-political 
approach	to	expand	the	definition	of	a	refugee	under	current	international	law.	Second	
is the extent to which forced migration is being incorporated into current domestic 
plans for climate change adaptation. Third is whether the OECD countries are willing 
to open their “immigration gates” to climate migrants. 
 
5.1. Expanding the definition of a “refugee”
There	have	been	some	attempts	to	broaden	the	existing	definition	of	a	political	
refugee to include those displaced for environmental reasons or to write a new con-
vention	that	specifically	protects	such	people.125	The	lack	of	an	accepted	definition	
of an environmental refugee means that, unless they’re relocated by extreme weather 
events,	their	displacement	does	not	trigger	any	access	to	financial	grants,	food	aid,	
tools, shelter, schools or clinics. 
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As a result there is no structural capacity in the international system to provide 
for environmental migrants. Climate migrants are not recognized as a problem in any 
binding international treaty nor is there an international body charged with providing 
for climate migrants, or even counting them. Instead the default response of OECD 
donor countries to extreme weather events is to give humanitarian aid and invest in 
early warning systems. 
In 2005 the Director of the UN University Institute for Environment and Human 
Security, Janos Bogardi, argued, “there are well-founded fears that the number of 
people	fleeing	untenable	environmental	conditions	may	grow	exponentially	as	the	
world experiences the effects of climate change and other phenomena. This new 
category	of	“refugee”	needs	to	find	a	place	in	international	agreements.	We	need	to	
better	anticipate	support	requirements,	similar	to	those	of	people	fleeing	other	unviable	
situations”.126 
In August 2006 a meeting of NGOs and some affected countries was held in the 
Maldives	to	discuss	how	an	expanded	definition	might	be	worked	into	international	
law. Inclusion within current refugee law would bring the existing weight of interna-
tional law and precedent to act on the issue – and would trigger certain obligations 
on the part of other countries being forced to act refugees. However, since then the 
process has faltered and it is hard to foresee any realistic consensus on an expanded 
definition	(see	Box	1,	page	13).127 
Box 5
the each-foR pRoject128
The Environmental Change and Forced Migration Project (EACH-FOR) 
is an attempt to address the statistical gap in our understanding of climate 
migration. Funded by the European Commission its multi-disciplinary team 
is made up of seven different research organizations spread across Europe. 
Over two years starting in mid 2007 they aim to support European policy with 
“forced	migration”	scenarios,	analysis	of	the	direct	(e.g.	desertification)	and	
indirect	(e.g.	conflicts)	environmental	effects	on	livelihoods	and	the	prepara-
tion	of	statistical	indicators	to	measure	environmental	refugee	flows.
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5.2 Adaptation in affected countries 
As climate change advances, individual countries will have to make a series of 
cost-benefit	decisions	on	what	they	want	to	protect;	building	sea	walls	here,	staging	
managed retreats from eroding shorelines there. The resources and foresight at the 
disposal	of	national	politicians	will	define	how	much	each	country	 is	affected	by	
climate change, including how many of its population are forced to move. 
Domestic policy remains a key variable in disaster risk reduction and population 
distribution (page 19). With the right kind of adaptation countries can reduce their 
vulnerability to the impacts of climate events and manage the evolution of climate 
processes. Cuba, for example, lies directly in a hurricane path but suffers less from 
hurricanes than its neighbours because of careful preparation, effective early warning 
systems and widespread storm education. 
But few countries are putting any plans in place for the prospect of large-scale 
forced climate migration. The UNFCCC has supported the development of National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) which are supposed to help the LDCs 
identify and rank their priorities for adaptation to climate change.129 However, none of 
the 14 submitted so far (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Haiti, Kiribati, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Samoa, Senegal) mentions 
migration or population relocation as a possible policy response.10
Of course migration may be the only possible adaptive response in the case of 
some	of	the	Small	Island	and	low-lying	states	where	rising	seas	will	eventually	flood	
large parts of the country. Andrew Simms of the New Economics Foundation points 
out that domestic level responses are, in some cases, an absurd proposition given that 
the national level might be under water.11
Migration is typically seen as a failure of adaptation, not a form of it. There are 
precedents though. Between 1984-5 the Ethiopian government resettled tens of thou-
sands of people from drought-stricken areas.12 Two decades later the Asian Tsunami 
gave new impetus to plans in the Maldives to organize a “staged retreat” from their 
outlying islands. The plan is to concentrate the islands’ 290,000 residents on several 
dozen, slightly higher islands than the 200 islands that the population is currently 
spread across.1 
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5.3 Immigration policy in less-affected countries
Another determinant of forced migration will be immigration policies in countries 
less affected by climate change, in particular the OECD countries. Some analysts are 
beginning to argue that immigration is both a necessary element of global redistribu-
tive justice and an important response to climate change; that greenhouse gas emitters 
should take an allocation of climate migrants in proportion to their historical emissions. 
Andrew Simms of the New Economics Foundation argues, “Is it right that while some 
states are more responsible for creating problems like global climate change, all states 
should bear equal responsibility to deal with its displaced people?”.14
It has been widely reported that New Zealand has agreed to accept the inhabitants 
of	the	South	Pacific	Island	state	of	Tuvalu	if	and	when	climate	change	leaves	their	
country uninhabitable.15 However, this is an urban myth: New Zealand only accepts 
75	Tuvaluans	each	year	through	the	immigration	service’s	Pacific	Access	Category	
which makes no reference to environmental degradation. No other country has yet 
been willing to set a precedent by explicitly accepting climate migrants under a 
refugee category. 
Sweden is the only country even to get close. Swedish immigration policy men-
tions environmental migrants as a special category as a “person in need of protection” 
who is unable to return to his native country because of an environmental disaster. 
However, the extent to which this includes climate change impacts has not yet been 
clarified.	In	the	parliamentary	text	explaining	the	category	a	nuclear	disaster	is	given	
as an example of an “environmental disaster” whereas natural disasters are not 
specifically	mentioned.16
However, there are increasing examples of immigration concessions for victims of 
natural disasters – albeit on an ad hoc basis. For example, in 200 the US immigration 
service extended for two more years the Temporary Protection Status it granted to 
80,000	Hondurans	who	had	fled	to	the	United	States	after	the	1998	Hurricane	Mitch	
which devastated large parts of Central America.17 The Regional Conference on 
Migration, which is also known as the “Puebla Process”, played an important role in 
influencing	the	US	“flexibility”	on	Temporary	protection.	Initiated	in	1996	the	Puebla	
process is an ongoing regional forum for migration in North and Central America and 
the Dominican Republic which fosters regular and constructive dialogue on migration 
issues between the member states.18
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After the 2004 Tsunami, Switzerland, Canada, and Malaysia temporarily suspended 
involuntary returns of failed asylum seekers to affected areas of India, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Indonesia. Likewise Australia put a high priority on processing tempo-
rary visas for victims and fast-tracking existing applications. The European Union, 
for its part, proposed offering temporary asylum to child victims of the disaster so 
as to allow them several months in Europe to recover from the trauma.19 Whether 
or not this adds up to an evolving norm of soft law is highly debateable, but it does 
show some “greyness” at the edges of immigration policy. 
There is a dilemma here. Relaxing immigration rules as part of a concerted policy 
to “release the population pressure” in areas affected by climate change could acceler-
ate the brain drain of talented individuals from the developing world to the developed 
– and worsen the “hollowing out” of affected economies, which is itself a driver of 
migration. On the other hand, shutting borders in both source and destination coun-
tries	undermines	remittance	economies	and	denies	developing	countries	the	benefits	
of access to the international labour market. 
Box 6
fencing the BoRdeR
At the other extreme is India’s 4,095 kilometre fence along the Bangladeshi 
border.	In	1985	a	fence	along	the	porous	Indian-Bangladesh	border	was	first	
discussed	to	stop	smuggling,	trafficking	and	illegal	immigration	(which	Delhi	
estimates at 20 million people annually).140 Construction started in 2002 and 
was	due	to	finish	in	mid-2007.	The	3.6	metre	high,	double	wire	fence,	built	
at	a	cost	11	billion	rupees	also	serves	the	purpose	of	controlling	the	flow	of	
future forced climate migrants.141
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6. ConCLUsions 
Environmental, economic and political degradation are connected – though the 
categories	are	permeable.	One	analyst	argues,	“One	classification	may	cause	the	other	
or, more likely, each drives the other in a vicious cycle of reinforcing degradations”.142 
Migration to the United States is an example, “though nominally economic migrants, 
many	of	the	estimated	1	million	people	who	flood	illegally	into	the	United	States	an-
nually from Mexico are in part driven by declining ecological conditions in a country 
where	60	per	cent	of	the	land	is	classified	as	severely	degraded”.14
Anthropogenic climate change exacerbates existing environmental, economic and 
social vulnerabilities. It follows that adaptation to climate change has to be broader 
than tackling the marginal increased impact of anthropogenic climate change. Focusing 
on the impacts of climate change without factoring in the local context is leading to 
some bizarre policy distortions. For example, in the Philippines, policymakers have 
begun	to	acknowledge	the	flood	threats	posed	by	a	projected	annual	sea	level	rise	
from climate change of 1 to  millimetres per year. But at the same time they are 
oblivious	to,	or	ignore,	the	main	reason	for	increasing	flood	risk:	excessive	ground	
water extraction which is lowering land surface by several centimetres to more than 
a decimetre per year.144 
On current climate change scenarios, a certain amount of forced climate migration 
is “locked in”. But how much depends on the international community’s mitigation 
and adaptation plans now. It is clear that the international community has to face up 
to the prospect of large-scale displacement caused by climate change. There is a need 
for international recognition of the problem, a better understanding of its dimensions 
and a willingness to tackle it. This should take several forms:
1. The international community needs to acknowledge formally the predicament 
of	forced	climate	migrants.	While	it	is	not	clear	that	an	expanded	definition	of	
a refugee under international law that included environmental degradation as 
a	“valid”	driver	of	displacement	would	lead	to	net	benefits	for	all	(traditional	
and environmental) refugees, some kind of international recognition is required 
to cement the issue on the international agenda. 
2. Development and adaptation policies in potential source countries of forced 
climate migrants need to focus on reducing people’s vulnerability to climate 
change, moving people away from marginal areas and supporting livelihoods 
that	are	more	resilient.	In	particular	more	efficient	use	of	existing	resources	
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would offset some of the predicted impacts of climate change. In Pakistan, 
for example, irrigated agriculture uses 85 per cent of the country’s fresh water 
supply but leakage and evaporation means that it is only 50 to 65 per cent 
efficient.145 
. A great deal more research is needed to understand the causes and consequen-
ces of climate migration and to monitor numbers. Practitioners, meanwhile, 
should develop better communication and working relationships between the 
different human rights, population, environmental and migration organizations 
that share a mandate to respond to population displacement.146
4. Finally, the international community needs to help generate incentives to keep 
skilled labour in developing countries but also to allow developing countries to 
capitalize	on	the	benefits	that	fluid	labour	markets	can	bring.	The	international	
regulation of labour migration, adaptation to climate change and capacity 
building in vulnerable countries are inherently intertwined. Migration will 
be used by some households in vulnerable countries as a means of adapting 
to climate change. Clearly there has to be a balance of policies that promotes 
the incentives for workers to stay in their home countries whilst not closing 
the door of international labour mobility. 
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AnneX 1 : the eMission sCenArios of the iPCC 
sPeCiAL rePort on eMission sCenArios (sres)147
A1. The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid 
economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, 
and	the	rapid	introduction	of	new	and	more	efficient	technologies.	Major	underlying	
themes are convergence among regions, capacity building and increased cultural and 
social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita 
income. The A1 scenario family develops into three groups that describe alternative 
directions of technological change in the energy system. The three A1 groups are dis-
tinguished by their technological emphasis: fossil intensive (A1FI), non-fossil energy 
sources	(A1T),	or	a	balance	across	all	sources	(A1B)	(where	balanced	is	defined	as	
not relying too heavily on one particular energy source, on the assumption that similar 
improvement rates apply to all energy supply and end use technologies).
A2. The A2 storyline and scenario family describes a very heterogeneous world. The 
underlying theme is self reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns 
across regions converge very slowly, which results in continuously increasing popula-
tion. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic 
growth and technological change more fragmented and slower than other storylines.
B1. The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with the 
same global population, that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter, as in the 
A1 storyline, but with rapid change in economic structures toward a service and 
information economy, with reductions in material intensity and the introduction of 
clean	 and	 resource	 efficient	 technologies.	The	 emphasis	 is	 on	global	 solutions	 to	
economic, social and environmental sustainability, including improved equity, but 
without additional climate initiatives.
B2. The B2 storyline and scenario family describes a world in which the emphasis 
is on local solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability. It is a world 
with continuously increasing global population, at a rate lower than A2, intermedi-
ate levels of economic development, and less rapid and more diverse technological 
change than in the B1 and A1 storylines. While the scenario is also oriented towards 
environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on local and regional levels.
The SRES scenarios do not include additional climate initiatives, which means 
that no scenarios are included that explicitly assume implementation of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or the emissions targets of the 
Kyoto Protocol.
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This study was conducted in three provinces 
in Cambodia – Koh Kong, Kampong Som 
and Siem Reap. The research investigates the 
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Cambodia for two target groups: commercially 
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and child domestic workers (CDWs). The 
objective of the research was to understand 
how the pull factors in different provinces lead 
to migration and trafficking. It also sought to 
clarify how the process of migration could 
itself lead to trafficking.
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The research presented in this volume uses case 
studies from around the world to examine the 
ways in which migration influences development. 
The studies reveal that it is seldom the simple 
act of migration but rather the conditions under 
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